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STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the I 
Adoption of Case No. 
TINA MARIE MAESTAS, 
a minor. 
13678 
R E S P O N D E N T ' S BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This is an action for the adoption of a minor child. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From a judgment 
for the natural father wherein the Petition for Adop-
tion was denied, the adopting parents appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The natural father seeks affirmance of the trial 
court's judgment denying the Petition for Adoption. 
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S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Although the adopting parents' brief sets out in 
great detail the chronology of this case, several impor-
tant facts necessary for a complete review of the trial 
court's ruling need to be considered. 
The natural father, after the divorce papers were 
served on him, came back to the natural mother's apart-
ment (T. 194) to request that he be allowed to see his 
children (T. 156, 218-219, 220), did in fact see them 
(T. 221), and continued to visit with the natural mother 
and his children several times a week during the sum-
mer (T. 225-226, 227). 
The Petition for Temporary Custody and Adop-
tion, paragraph 7 (R. 5), dated October 15, 1971, re-
cited: 
I t is not known at this time whether or not the 
natural father will give his consent for said 
adoption due to the fact that his whereabouts 
are unknown; however, he has failed in his 
duty of support relative to the child since the 
separation of the natural parents, and there-
fore, it is alleged that he has abandoned said 
child and thus his consent to said adoption is 
unnecessary and not legally required under 
the laws of Utah. 
The natural father, after the divorce was granted, 
the adoption papers signed, and the natural mother left 
Utah, did not know where the natural mother and his 
two children were (T. 361), inquired unsuccessfully of 
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the natural mother's relatives where they were (T. 222-
223), and assumed that both of his children were with 
the natural mother (T. 359). 
In the O r d e r Granting Temporary Custody 
(R. 12), dated January 17,1972, the Court recited that 
the ". . . natural father has not given his consent to said 
adoption, his present whereabouts being unknown to 
[the adopting parents] 
After the natural mother returned to Utah, the 
natural father bought his children clothes and other 
things and gave the natural mother some money for both 
her needs and those of her children (T. 359-360). 
The natural father did not know that the natural 
mother had given his child up for adoption, signed 
adoption papers, and placed his child with the adopting 
parents until one week before the April 18, 1972 hear-
ing (T. 221-222, 358, 359). 
The natural father, immediately after he found out 
where his child was, contacted an attorney and filed his 
Petition and Motion to Intervene (T. 361). 
The natural father's Motion to Intervene, para-
graphs 1 and 2 (R. 24), dated April 18, 1972, recited 
that ". . . he has never given his consent to the adoption 
of his daughter, and . . . will not consent to the adoption 
of his daughter. . . ." The natural father's Petition, 
paragraph 9 (R. 27), dated April 25, 1972, recited that 
the natural father " . . . has not consented to the adoption 
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of his child and will not give his consent to said adop-
tion." 
The natural father's prior attorney, Mrs. Myrna 
Mae Nebeker, Esq., told him he did not have to pay any 
child support to the adopting parents and instructed 
him not to visit his child while she was living with the 
adopting family (T. 359, 363). 
The adopting mother told the natural mother dur-
ing one of her visits to her home to see the child that she 
did not want the natural parents to visit the child 
(T. 304). 
In the Findings of Fact, paragraph 5, of the Or-
der Denying Motion to Set Aside Consent of Natural 
Mother and Temporary Order of Custody (R. 21), 
dated May 4, 1972, the Court found that: 
The natural father has not, to date, appeared 
in open court and given his consent for the 
adoption of said minor child; however, he has 
retained counsel and has filed a Motion to In-
tervene in these proceedings and has, pursuant 
to the terms of said Motion, indicated that he 
will not consent to the adoption of said child. 
The natural father, after he filed his Petition and 
Motion to Intervene, testified that he contacted his prior 
attorney, Mrs. Nebeker, "every chance" he got to find 
out what the status of his case was (T. 362), that he 
thought she was doing something all the time and the 
best she could on his case (T. 362), that he never had 
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any doubt at all that she was taking care of his case 
for him (T. 363, 364), and that he had complete faith 
in her (T. 363-364). 
The natural mother testified that the natural 
father loves his children (T. 156). 
There is no evidence in the record that the adopt-
ing parents, between October 15, 1971, the date of the 
Petition for Temporary Custody and Adoption, and 
April 18, 1972, the date the natural father filed his 
Petition and Motion to Intervene, ever attempted to 
serve the notice of proceedings upon the natural father 
as required by Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-5 (1965). 
In addition, there is no evidence that the adopting 
parents attempted to locate the natural father other than 
by the single inquiry to the natural mother's babysitter 
concerning her knowledge of the whereabouts of the 
natural father (T. 296-297). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
T H E TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
H E L D THAT FOR PURPOSES OF 
DETERMINING W H E T H E R A NAT-
URAL PARENT'S C O N S E N T TO 
ADOPTION IS UNNECESSARY, DE-
SERTION BY A NATURAL PARENT 
MUST BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED 
BEFORE ANY EVIDENCE OF T H E 
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B E S T I N T E R E S T S O F T H E C H I L D 
MAY B E R E C E I V E D . 
The natural father submits that because of the 
parent-child relation, desertion of a child by a natural 
parent firmly must be established by clear and in-
dubitable evidence before any question regarding the 
best interests of the child may be received. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the landmark deci-
sion of In re Adoption of Walton, 123 Utah 380, 384, 
259 P . 2d 881, 883 (1953), where a wife and her second 
husband's decree of adoption was reversed for insuffi-
cient evidence of separation and nonsupport by the 
natural father as constituting desertion, stated: 
So jealously guarded is the parent-child re-
lation that uniformly it is held that the aban-
donment or desertion firmly must be estab-
lished [by clear and indubitable evidence], be-
fore any question as to the best interests or 
welfare of the child can be the subject of in-
quiry. 
[T]he welfare of the child is of great impor-
tance in custody cases, but quite immaterial in 
adoption cases until an effective abandonment 
of parental rights is shown. (Emphasis added) 
The adopting parents' contention that the subse-
quent decision of Wilson v. Pierce, 14 Utah2d 317, 383 
P . 2d 925 (1963) modified the Walton ruling is with-
out merit. Indeed, the Walton test for establishing when 
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a natural parent has deserted his child as quoted above 
was specifically cited and approved in the Wilson de-
cision. Id. at 319, 383 P . 2d at 926. In addition, unlike 
this appeal which involves only the question of adoption, 
the Wilson decision involved a Petition for Adoption 
as well as a petition in habeas corpus for custody. Id. at 
318, 383 P . 2d at 925-926. I t is significant also that the 
Wilson decision referred to two prior decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court, both of which involved custody 
questions. 14 Utah2d at 322, 383 P . 2d at 928. Those 
two decisions were Jensen v. Earley, 63 Utah 604, 228 
P . 217 (1924) which involved unlawful detention and 
custody; and, Kurtz v. Christensen, 61 Utah 1, 209 P. 
340 (1922) which involved a habeas corpus action al-
leging unlawful custody and control. The language in 
the Wilson decision regarding the best interests of the 
child is relevant solely to the question of custody and has 
no relevance at all to the question of adoption. 
The sole issue raised by counsel for the natural 
father at the August 23, 1973 hearing on the Petition 
for Adoption was whether the natural father had de-
serted his child pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-
30-5 (1965) (T. 280). The question of custody was not 
raised at any stage of the proceedings below and Judge 
Hall correctly held 
. . . that the proceeding this morning should 
first address itself to the matter of negligence, 
desertion or abandonment under the provisions 
of 78-30-4 [sic] and that the matter of the best 
interests of the child and custody and so on at 
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the present time should be in an inferior posi-
tion. (T. 289). 
Therefore, Judge Hall did not eliminate consideration 
of the best interests of the child; rather, he simply held, 
in line with the Walton decision, that desertion firmly 
must be established before any question as to the best 
interests of the child can be the subject of inquiry. 
The legal standard suggested by the adopting 
parents for establishing desertion, namely, whether the 
conduct of the natural parent has been such that it has 
destroyed the "psychological parental relationship" 
with the child, is totally without support in either statu-
tory or case law in Utah. This recommended standard 
goes to the question of what the law should be rather 
than what the law is, which is clearly a legislative rather 
than a judicial inquiry. As the Utah Supreme Court 
noted in In re Adoption of Jameson, 20 Utah2d 53, 54, 
432 P. 2d 881, 882 (1967): "Adoption proceedings are 
statutory in nature and we are not inclined to give the 
statute a meaning not intended by the Legislature/' 
(Emphasis added) In addition, it should be noted that 
it was not the conduct of the natural father which had 
any effect on the so-called "psychological parental re-
lationship"; rather, it was the conduct of the adopting 
parents who delayed this matter in the court system for 
almost two years, and the natural mother of the child 
who hid her from the natural father. 
In conclusion, the trial court correctly held that 
for purposes of determining whether a natural parent's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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consent to adoption is unnecessary, desertion by a nat-
ural parent must be resolved before any examination 
may be had of the best interests of the child. 
P O I N T I I . 
T H E T R I A L COURT CORRECTLY 
H E L D IN D E N Y I N G T H E P E T I -
TION F O R A D O P T I O N T H A T T H E 
N A T U R A L F A T H E R H A D NOT D E -
S E R T E D H I S C H I L D B E C A U S E T H E 
E V I D E N C E F A I L E D TO S A T I S F Y 
T H E H I G H B U R D E N OF P R O O F F O R 
E S T A B L I S H I N G A P R I M A F A C I E 
CASE OF D E S E R T I O N . 
Because the natural father has never consented 
to the adoption of his child and has not been "judicially 
deprived of the custody of the child on account of cruel-
ty, neglect, or desertion", the adopting parents, who 
never made any claim to the contrary (T. 380-381), 
were obligated to establish that the natural father had 
deserted his child as provided in Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-30-5 (1965), as follows: 
A child deserted by its parent or parents, and 
having no legal guardian, may be adopted as 
in this chapter provided, without the consent 
of the parent or parents having deserted said 
child, when the district court in which the pro-
ceedings are pending shall determine that such 
child has been deserted by its parent or parents. 
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Such a determination is strictly construed against a 
finding of desertion and, in effect, favors the relation-
ship between natural parents and their children. E.g., 
Deverauoc' Adoption v. Brown, 2 Utah2d 30, 32, 268 
P.2d 995, 997 (1954). 2 Am.Jur.2d, "Adoption" § 7 
(1962). 
The test for overriding the consent of a natural 
parent was enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
In re Adoption of Walton, supra at 382-384, 259 P.2d 
at 883-884 as follows: 
Courts have not hesitated to build a strong 
fortress around the parent-child relation, and 
have stocked it with ammunition in the form of 
established rules that add to its impregnability. 
To sever the relationship successfully, one 
must have abandoned the child, and such 
abandonment must be with a specific intent so 
to do,—an intent to sever all correlative rights 
and duties incident to the relationship. Such 
intent must be proved by him who asserts it, 
by proof that not only preponderates, but 
which must be clear and satisfactory,—some-
thing akin to that degree of proof necessary 
to establish an offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, or, as one authority puts it cby clear and 
indubitable evidence? 
Perhaps this court has traveled as far as 
any in giving expression to the type of aban-
donment intended to exist in order to sever 
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parental ties when we said [in Jensen v. 
Barley, supra at 612, 228 P . at 220•:] 
'abandonment, in such cases, ordinarily 
means that the parent has placed the child 
on some doorstep or left it in some con-
venient place in the hope that someone 
will find it and take charge of it, or has 
abandoned it entirely to chance or fate.' 
(Emphasis added) 
Subsequently, in In re Adoption of Jameson, supra, 
this Court held that a mother sentenced to prison for an 
indefinite period of time for issuing fraudulent checks 
had not deserted her children so as to permit their adop-
tion by their natural father and his present wife without 
the natural mother's consent. In so holding, the Court 
stated: 
We are of the opinion that the Legislature 
in using the word 'desert' meant to give it its 
ordinary meaning. We believe and so hold that 
the language of the statute means an inten-
tional abandonment of the child rather than a 
separation due to misfortune or misconduct. 
Id. at 54-55, 432 P.2d at 882 (Emphasis 
added). 
See State in Interest of K B , 7 Utah 
2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958) and Taylor V. Waddoups, 
121 Utah 279, 241 P.2d 157 (1952). 
The law in Utah on this point is in accord with 
generally accepted principles in other jurisdictions. See, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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e.g., 2 Am.Jur.2d, "Adoption" § 31-33 (1962); Annot., 
47 A.L.R.2d 824 (1956); and, Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 
662 (1954). 
The testimony before the trial court clearly indi-
cates that the evidence fails to meet the high burden of 
proof for establishing a prima facie case of desertion 
by a natural parent. 
The adopting parents have referred to four areas 
where evidence purportedly establishes their prima facie 
case for desertion. However, in examining the facts 
and reasoning underlying each of these areas, the fal-
lacies of the adopting parents' argument become ap-
parent. 
First, the only fact offered to support the natural 
father's alleged lack of sincerity of purpose was two 
apparently contradictory statements made by the natu-
ral mother as to whether she desired the natural father 
to have custody of their child. App. Br. pp. 22-23. Such 
a contradiction certainly does not indicate an intention 
by the natural father to desert his child. Also, the reason 
for the natural mother's "change of mind" regarding 
custody is hardly evidence of desertion. 
Second, the only argument to support the asser-
tion that the natural father had withheld parental pres-
ence from his child prior to the April 18, 1972 hearing 
is the observation that there was no testimony to the 
contrary. App. Br. p. 23. However, the evidence indi-
cates that this argument has little foundation in fact. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
The testimony is uncontradictory that the natural father, 
after the divorce papers were served on him, returned 
to the natural mother's apartment (T. 194) to request 
that he be allowed to see his children (T. 156, 218-219, 
220), did in fact see them (T. 221), and continued to 
visit with the natural mother and his children several 
times a week during the summer of 1971 (T. 225-226, 
227). After the divorce was granted, the adoption papers 
signed, and the natural mother left Utah, the natural 
father did not know where the natural mother and his 
two children were (T. 361), inquired unsuccessfully 
of the natural mother's relatives where they were (T. 
222-223), and assumed that both of his children were 
with the natural mother (T. 359). In addition, the 
natural father, after the natural mother returned to 
Utah, bought his children clothes and other things and 
gave the natural mother some money for both her needs 
and those of her children (T. 359-360). Therefore, the 
assertion that the natural father had withheld parental 
presence from his child prior to the April 18, 1972 
hearing is clearly without merit. 
Third, the argument that the natural father had 
not given any gifts to his child and had not visited the 
child after he learned where his child was (App. Br. p. 
23) ignores the critically important testimony by the 
natural father that his prior attorney, Mrs. Nebeker, 
instructed him not to contact the adopting parents in 
any way (T. 359, 363), and, further, told him that he 
didn't have to pay child support (T. 363). Even assum-
ing that this was poor legal advice, the natural father 
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cannot be said to have deserted his child by doing as 
his attorney instructed when he had instructed Mrs. 
Nebeker to resist the adoption and followed her advice 
to secure that end. I t should be noted, also, that the 
adopting mother admitted telling the natural mother 
that she no longer wanted the natural parents to visit 
their child (T. 304), a statement which indicates that, 
even if the natural father had not followed his attorney's 
advice, he might very well have been precluded from 
visiting his child anyway. The further claim that the 
natural father deserted his child by not demanding a 
hearing on his Petition and Motion to Intervene is totally 
without merit. The adopting parents never attempted 
to deprive, define or determine the rights of the natural 
father in his child after he filed his Motion to Intervene 
on April 18, 1972 (R. 24) until the hearing on August 
23, 1973. More than sixteen months passed from the date 
they were notified in his pleadings that he would not 
consent to the adoption until they acted on their Petition. 
They did not have to wait but they chose to do so, 
apparently so they could make the very argument they 
made to the trial court (T. 379-380, 385-386, 388) and 
this Court (App. Br. 23-25), namely, that his failure 
to notice-up his Petition and Motion to Intervene is 
indicative of his intent to desert his child. As Judge 
Hall correctly pointed out (T. 389), the adopting par-
ents could have noticed-up the natural father's Petition 
and Motion to Intervene as well as he could have. I t 
is also interesting to note that there is no evidence in 
the record that the adopting parents, between October 
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15, 1971, the date of the Petition for Custody and Adop-
tion, and April 18, 1972, the date the natural father 
filed his Petition and Motion to Intervene, ever at-
tempted to serve the notice of proceedings upon the 
natural father as required by Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-30-5 (1965). In addition, there is no evidence that 
the adopting parents attempted to locate the natural 
father other than by the single inquiry to the natural 
mother's babysitter concerning her knowledge of the 
whereabouts of the natural father (T. 296-297). 
Fourth, the adopting parents, both in oral argu-
ment before the trial court (T. 388-388) and in their 
brief (App. Br. p. 25), have strenuously argued that 
the failure by the natural father to pay child support 
constitutes a strong element in their case. In addition, 
the Petition for Temporary Custody and Adoption, 
paragraph 7 (R. 5), dated October 15, 1971, contains 
the following allegation: 
I t is not known at this time whether or not 
the natural father will give his consent for 
said adoption due to the fact that his where-
abouts are unknown; however, he has failed in 
his duty of support relative to the child since 
the separation of the natural parents, and 
therefore, it is alleged that he has abandoned 
said child and thus his consent to said adoption 
is unnecessary and not legally required under 
the laws of Utah. (Emphasis added) 
However, the law relative to this point is decidedly 
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against the adopting parents because the failure to pay 
child support can only be considered, at best, a minor 
inference of desertion. 
The general law on this point has been stated in 
2 Am.Jur.2d, "Adoption" § 35 (1962) as follows: 
Nonsupport is not synonymous with 
abandonment as the latter term is used in 
provisions of adoption statutes dispensing with 
the consent of the natural parent who has 
abandoned his child to its adoption by another; 
and mere nonsupport, in and of itself, does not 
constitute abandonment, and is not always a 
factor tending to establish abandonment. (Em-
phasis added) 
Several courts have recognized this virtually universal 
rule. E.g., Schwaiger v. Headrick, 281 Ala. 392, 203 
So.2d 114, 115-116 (1967) (Natural father's non-
support, except for two monthly payments, and his fail-
ure to visit his child held not constituting desertion); 
Logan v. Coup, 238 Md. 253, 208 A.2d 694, 697-698 
(1965) (Natural father's consent, subsequently with-
drawn, and his failure to visit or pay child support held 
not constituting desertion); In re Adoption of Hang art-
ner, 407 Pa. 601, 181 A.2d 280, 284 (1962) (Natural 
father's failure to pay child support held not per se 
desertion where natural mother concealed child's where-
abouts from natural father); In re Anonymous, 31 
Misc.2d262, 220 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1961) (Natural father's 
failure to make child support payments and his having 
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left the children with the natural mother during his 
annual 30-day visitation period held not constituting 
desertion); and, Smith v. Smith, 67 Idaho 349, 180 
P.2d 853, 855 (1947) (Nonsupport held not synony-
mous with desertion). I t is important to note that allow-
ing others to assume the burden of supporting a child 
may not constitute even an inference of desertion. See 
Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 662, 681 (1954). 
The rule in Utah is identical with the general rule 
announced above, namely, that desertion is not synony-
mous with nonsupport, even though it may be a factor 
in establishing desertion. In re Adoption of Walton, 
supra at 384, 259 P.2d at 883. 
In evaluating this argument, however, it should be 
noted that, first, the natural father did not know where 
the natural mother and his children were from October, 
1971 until April, 1972 (T. 221-222, 358, 359) so he 
arguably wouldn't have known where to send any child 
support money anyway; second, the natural father did 
pay some money to the natural mother prior to the April 
18,1972 hearing (T. 359-360) ; third, Mrs. Nebeker told 
him he did not have to pay any child support money 
(T. 359, 363); and, fourth, because the natural father 
knew after April, 1972 that his child was being taken 
care of by another family (T. 359-360), it is not un-
reasonable to assume that he may have considered fur-
ther child support payments unnecessary. The natural 
father submits that in considering all of the above facts, 
the conclusion is undeniable that the actions by the 
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natural father certainly do not constitute desertion 
within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-5 
(1965). 
Finally, it is important to note other evidence in 
the record which indicates that the natural father has not 
deserted his child: first, he did not know that the natural 
mother had given his child up for adoption, signed 
adoption papers, and placed his child with the adopting 
parents, until one week before the April 18, 1972 hear-
ing (T. 221-222, 358, 359); second, immediately after 
he found out where his child was, he contacted an attor-
ney and filed his Petition and Motion to Intervene (T. 
361) ; third, after he filed his Petition and Motion to 
Intervene, he contacted his prior attorney, Mrs. Nebe-
ker, "every chance" he got to find out what the status 
of his case was (T. 362), thought she was doing some-
thing all the time and the best she could on his case (T. 
362), never had any doubt at all that she was taking 
care of his case for him (T. 363, 364), and had complete 
faith in her (T. 363-364) ; and, fourth, the natural father 
loves his children (T. 156). 
In conclusion, the denial of the Petition for Adop-
tion was proper in view of the failure of the adopting 
parents to satisfy the high burden of proof for establish-
ing a prima facie case of desertion by the natural father 
of his child. 
P O I N T I I I . 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
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I N I N I T I A L L Y R E F U S I N G TO 
A L L O W T E S T I M O N Y F R O M T H E 
N A T U R A L P A R E N T S B E C A U S E A L L 
O B J E C T I O N S TO T H E I R T E S T I F Y -
I N G W E R E R E M O V E D A T A SUB-
S E Q U E N T H E A R I N G . 
During the course of the August 23, 1973 hearing 
before Judge Hall, the natural parents were called to 
testify (T. 306, 355). Although various husband-wife/ 
marital privileges and statutory and constitutional pro-
visions were raised as objections to their testifying at 
that time, counsel for each of the natural parents with-
drew their objections at a subsequent hearing on 
February 8, 1973 (T. 300-301). At that hearing, both 
natural parents were present having been brought to 
the hearing by their respective counsel and counsel for 
the adopting parents indicated he did not have any 
further questions to ask them relevant to the question 
of desertion (T. 308). Therefore, any defect in the 
hearing of August 23, 1973 was cured in the hearing 
of February 8, 1974. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, in State in Interest of JS13 25 Utah2d 
101, 107, 476 P.2d 1013, 1017 (1970), where the father 
of an illegitimate child who had publicly acknowledged 
it was held to have a legal right to the care, custody and 
control of his child, this Court emphasized the delicacy 
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of questions of this nature by citing a New York State 
decision for the 
. . . fundamental principle that no court can, 
for any but the gravest reasons, transfer a child 
from its natural parent to any other person, 
since the right of a parent, under natural law, 
to establish a home and bring up children is a 
fundamental one and beyond the reach of any 
court. 
I t is undeniable that the natural father has neither 
consented to the adoption nor been judicially deprived 
of the custody of his daughter. In addition, the undis-
puted facts clearly indicate that he has not deserted 
his child and has done everything he could under the 
circumstances to maintain his parental relationship with 
her. Therefore, Appellants have failed to establish that 
he deserted his child and the trial court's denial of their 
Petition for Adoption should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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